A plea for the logical approach in argumentation theory
Abstract
Current studies of argumentation are distanced from logic. In this paper I argue that restoring the link between the study of argumentation and this discipline could be beneficial for both the descriptive and the normative goals of this research field. After highlighting some aspects of the emergence of contemporary argumentation theory, emphasizing the idea of ‘perspectives’, I explain how the recognition of its objectives and tasks made the coexistence of various approaches or perspectives to the study of argumentative reality problematic. I suggest some explanatory hypotheses about the abandonment of the logical approach in favor of other alternatives, and then I offer reasons for conducting the systematic study of argumentation from this approach. In addition to the normative considerations and descriptive tools that can be presented in its favor, I argue that the logical approach can provide a kind of integration to this research field in ways that are not available to other approaches.References
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