Opponents or colleagues? Disagreement and adversariality in Argumentation Theory
Abstract
In this paper I claim that the link between argumentation and disagreement is not natural; furthermore, I argue that conceiving this link as a natural one has had detrimental results for argumentation theory. To support this claim, I begin by showing that disagreement is not a necessary condition for argumentation and that the function of argumentation is not to resolve disagreements or to reduce differences of opinion. Next, I argue that disagreement in argumentation is usually conceived from an adversarial paradigm: as a conflict of beliefs (or other mental states). I conclude by showing that, even when approaching it from disagreement, it is not necessary to conceive argumentation adversarially; instead, I propose a partial paradigm shift in argumentation theory: ceasing to conceive arguers as adversaries and conceiving them as colleagues in a collective and common endeavor offers the opportunity for epistemic improvement.References
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