Completion and reconstruction of arguments. Minimalism and deductivism.
Abstract
Reception: November 23, 2016 Accepted: February 14, 2017 In this work I am interested in highlighting a common problem in the philosophy of language and the theory of argumentation, namely the completion of propositional content and the reconstruction of arguments, associated to the enthymemes. I will focus on a couple of parallels between these two disciplines regarding how to deal with these two phenomena. Mainly, I want to explore the semantic minimalism that has taken place in the philosophy of language and what Levi (1995) has called deductivism in theory of argumentation. What I will do is to present each of the proposals in their specific domain, to show how they relate and to expose some of the problems that these proposals face. With this I intend to show that the treatment given to enthymemes and to the completion of propotitional content by deductivism and by semantic minimalism, respectively, it’s not quite correct. The relevance of this paper consists in the relationship established between the semantic minimalism that has taken place in philosophy of language and the deductivism that has been exposed in theory of argumentation.References
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