Rationality and persuasion from an epistemological viewpoint

  • Fabián Bernache Maldonado Universidad de Guadalajara
Keywords: realism, antirealism, rationality, truth, persuasion.

Abstract

Reception: September 5, 2016   Accepted: September 23, 2016 One of the most important current debates in epistemology is the debate between realist and antirealist conceptions of truth and knowledge. The debate centers on the question of the acceptance or refusal of the conception of truth as correspondence with reality and, accordingly, on the question of the acceptance or refusal of the conception of knowledge as correct and rational description of the world. The aim of this paper is to show that important consequences for our understanding of the relationship between argumentation, rationality, and persuasion follow from the ideas discussed in this debate.

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Published
2016-10-17